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THE VALUE OF CHANGE 
AND INVARIABILITY
Renaissance Man concentrated his attention on the world of antiquity, 
searching there not only for patterns but, most of all, for justification, for 
an explanation of human nature, the uniqueness of man and his role in the 
world around him, as well as the understanding of his own inner weak­
nesses. At the same time, they were negating the output of the Middle 
Ages (the worst manifestation of which was destroying the architecture of 
the “dark” period1). In his history, man has often negated and erased that 
which the previous generations had bequeathed to him. However, it was 
Bernard of Chartre who said that we owe everything to the giants upon 
whose shoulders we rest. The man of the Middle Ages sought answers to 
his problems in the same cultural source as Renaissance Man: in antiq­
uity. One could say, therefore, that the so called Renaissance “break­
through” did not represent such a big change2 irrespective of what Re­
naissance Man himself thought. While the manner or method of thinking 
and philosophising, may have changed, the same problems as his prede­
cessors had - a question which remained and still remains unresolved: 
who he is and how he should act. Aversion to „barbarians” and to the 
“now” and the nostalgic longing for a golden age of the past is encoun­
tered by the historian of ideas again and again through out history. This 
resulted in searching in the past for “paradise lost”, for the values and its 
1 Comp. R. Pemoud, Inaczej o średniowieczu [Differently about the Middle Ages], 
translated by Krystyna Husarska, Volumen, Warszawa 2002, p. 47.
2 Comp. St. Świerzawski, Filozofia XV wieku [/5‘* Century Philosophy], ATK, War­
szawa 1974, vol. 3, p. 327.
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system that had disappeared or had been perceived as having been dis­
torted over time.3
3 Comp. P. Rossi, Zatonięcie bez świadka. Idea postępu [Drowning without witness. 
The idea of progress], translated by Anna Dudzińska-Facca, PAN, Warszawa 1998, p. 52.
Evolution of human thinking is also an evolution of human uncer­
tainty. From the time of the Middle Ages, the human being, placed in the 
world’s order between animals and angels, had a distinctive metaphysical 
position. Subsequent science has violated that order, and man has lost his 
unique position along with losing the ontological hierarchy. That does not 
mean that Man of the Middle Ages was not experienced as problematic. 
Rather the generations that followed lost in comparison a clearly defined 
position and definition of human essence. Recalling Schiller, Plessner 
shows the phenomenon of contradictory ways of human thinking that is 
so characteristic of the modem times. Indeed, modernity yielded still 
more confusion.
Schiller posited that while the individual change and leave the stage 
on, or rather in, which his role is played, the stage itself (history) remains. 
Plessner, on the other hand, points to a dynamic interplay between the 
individual and his natural and social environmental - what today is often 
refused to by sociologists and cultural anthropologists as “social struc­
ture”. This is how contemporary man lost his immutable and unchanging 
self which had served as his points of reference just as a compass can be 
relied upon to always point north.
Asking questions about human nature, philosophy has searched for 
a metaphysical solution on which it, can, by definition, rely. A metaphysi­
cal solution here is, and once again, the constant and immutable element. 
Breaking with the tradition of the Middle Ages, modem philosophy began 
to distance itself from this metaphysic. By this metaphysic was all but out 
of sight. Scheier, for example, in his anthropological researches, still 
referred to being and essence. Man is essentially a spiritual being who can 
exceed his material, biological determinations. Meanwhile, in Germany, 
anthropological philosophy had begun to depart from this research exem­
plified here by Scheier again, outlining instead and in opposition to 
a naturalistic conception.
Both Gehlner and then Plessner considered man to have no being, no 
unchanging and immutable self. One can try to describe a human, but this 
description is merely a representation in time of his development, and 
variability. But in so doing above all, one must not lose sight of man’s 
biological “roots”; one must remember that he is an animal, among other 
animals and that culture’s pasture grows from this biological roots. Re­
peating after Herder that man is an animal marked by lack, Gehlner posits 
that man meets with the pastures green of this lack with culture. So in this 
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way, culture is a specifically, human achievement. As an animal not ac­
commodated to the world, man fills this lack with institutions, values, 
science - the whole complex and codified area of cultural activity that 
allows for existing and coping not only with external reality, but also with 
one’s own internal weaknesses. Inside culture and its institutions this 
freedom is secured. Culture according to Gehlner, provides man with to 
the environment in which he may become, or better, fulfil himself. And as 
history changes, cultures change or to paraphrases Schiller, the actor and 
the stage change, however one thing remains constant: the change itself. 
This way, the contemporary philosophers find a paradigm of invariability, 
an element that allows for formulating an answer concerning the human 
condition. That paradigm produces in every culture many different insti­
tutions and although they may differ or even contradict each in its own 
way provides for self development and fulfilment.
It is rationality, a typically human property, that allows for the devel­
opment of culture. Animals have developed instinct that allows them to 
survive and to function properly in the world. Man’s instinct, on the other 
hand, has never developed to the same extent as animals. Instead, in the 
course of evolution he has developed rationality. 20th century philoso­
phers such as Szestov and Levinas have levelled an endictant against 
ratio, defining it as a paradigm that curtails spontaneity and sensitivity in 
man. Gehlner, to the contrary, as we have seen pointed out that it is pre­
cisely the ratio that allows for spontaneity and freedom, since it allows 
man to express himself. In freedom and spontaneity relieved from the 
brutish struggle, for survival, man can feel safe and sound in his custom 
built accommodation.
Man was similarly defined by Plessner, who pointed to an open and 
undefined essence or nature. The Gehlnerian notion of being as marked 
with lack implied the challenge to meet that lack, to become human. 
Plessnerian “openness” signifies that man can, as it were, create himself 
together with the direction that it gives him, with every attempt at 
“closing” his nature in social role and structure. Man’s biology makes 
him, on the one hand, ill adapted to and vulnerable in this world, however 
on the other hand, it is precisely due to this biology or certain features 
thereof that has allowed him to develop a quite unique perspective on the 
world, exemplified in his ever more elaborate use of tools or what Hei­
degger somewhat disparagingly calls “technics”.
Rationality, as in Gehlner’s system, plays an important role in Pless- 
ner’s thought. Rationality emerges from the order of biological evolution. 
“It took may millions of years for life to create a species named homo 
sapiens. - writes Plessner - At that moment a new thing begins: cultural 
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activity.”4 Evolution has lead to such a moment in human development in 
which he can begin to shape the further stages of development himself. 
From this moment, man begun to develop and shape himself in a different 
direction from the primates5, which has lead to the creation of patterns of 
behaviour and processes of thought that are quite unknown in nature. 
From man’s biology, hidden as potentiality ratio emerged and it is ratio 
that has helped man develop onto the culture-level so distinct from bio­
logical. “Disclosure” of rationality takes place, however, as Plessner him­
self stresses, at the second stage of development. However ratio6, albeit 
biologically conditioned, assists in the production and development of 
culture, and in so doing develops to that cultural level, serves as a spring 
board to human relations, behaviour, cultural patterns and codes. Then the 
development or rather further or more rapid development of rationality 
can take place. This second stage follows quickly on the first. But this 
development of ratio does not take place in isolation. There is a mutual 
conditioning between it and culture. Culture which develops reason and 
rationality, and rationality influences culture.
4 H. Plessner, Pytanie o conditio humana [Asking for human condition], translated by 
Małgorzata Łukasiewicz, PIW, Warszawa, 1988, p. 36.
5 Comp. M. Tomasello, Kulturov/e źródła ludzkiego poznania, translated by Karol 
Sabath, P1W, Warszawa 2004, chapter I.
6 H. Plessner, op.cit., p. 36.
Man, as a biological species, emerges and develops in life, life that is 
active and in turn activating, life which is variable and in turn producing 
an infinite variety. Each step up on life’s levels requires bigger engage­
ment or commitment or behalf of the species itself, since it requires more 
advanced adaptation to the environment. Rationality is, then a kind of 
answer to this levelled existence. The notion of life taken by Plessner 
from, among others, the dictionaries of Bergson and Dilthey, has the 
meaning of a carrier of all experiences; biological and cultural ones. It is 
the cause of all existence, hidden within reality. The order of rationality is 
as much as any other founded on and in life as cause and carrier. Refer­
ring to Bergson and Dilthey, Plessner shows that the concepts of these 
two philosophers helps us find an element that may unify the humanities 
and the natural sciences, an element that explains the human’s biological 
and cultural unity. This element is, of course, life. Both of them, however, 
approach life from different perspectives. Bergson, pointing to 
“intuition”, tells us to look for understanding of life in contrast to say, 
Descartes, beyond the sphere of science and the sciential, in “pure” expe­
rience itself, in perhaps one might venture a phenomenological sense, 
what happens and what surrounds us. This approach indicates that, in 
answering the question about man, man must refer to his multiple attri­
butes or elements; rationality alone is not definitive (although it plays 
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a causal and decisive role in culture). In order to “get to know” man, one 
should not, then eschew “pure” experience nor should he prioritise reason 
over emotion. Dilthey in his hermeneutic vision puts emphasis on the fact 
that man exists in history and cannot then be understand in isolation of it. 
So then, the “experience” referred to by Dilthey is a historical experience, 
conditioned by events and circumstances. To think thus is to conceive of 
man as causally linked to his own history, his own epoch, as a being 
shaped by, and in that sense, subordinate to it. Life should be understood 
as essentially a temporal phenomenon with its associations of change and 
development. And as life fluxes so does man, his history and culture.
Plessner shows how, in the history of European thought, man and his 
place in the world underwent transformation. Once man was understood 
as subordinated to God, as a non-autonomous and extrinsic being. Later 
man’s subordination was to nature and its laws. Now man does not even 
look for these such dependencies. Thus, it is demonstrated and now 
“known” that the only invariable element in human life is variability, of 
both culture and biology. The world of mankind is an open world, it is 
a world of more and more new possibilities and theories concerning hu­
man nature. Contemporary man is a man of variability and autonomy 
- his reality is in that sense “open”. He has no one rule which compels 
him to one way of thinking and acting. But he is also a man of and in 
history and it is his historicity, to which he owes his “openness”. His­
toricity which, burdens man with many different past events and ideas at 
the same time open up a whole range of possibilities for his future exis­
tence. In this way, man becomes aware that he is an individual in the face 
of history, “universal”, events, other people. And this awareness prevents 
him from chaos and the loss of autonomy. It can give him an opportunity 
to experience himself as a full, multi-dimensional human being. Com­
bining the biological and the cultural, the rational with the emotional, 
man can become for himself a unity and entireity.
In this context, when we consider the Renaissance, we see that its idea 
is rooted in man’s very way of thinking. The human world is charactrised 
by constant change, of views and ideas. Generation after generation of 
philosophers and men of science pose questions about man and his con­
dition. And new things emerge from the predecessors’ ideas (by way of 
inspiration or by radical negation, which I call inspiration by denial). 
However development bears a certain constant element. The Renaissance 
we are accustomed to speak of is an intellectual movement of the 15th and 
the 16th Century, and historians also point to the 12th Century Renais­
sance. I suggest that the common thing for both these “breakthrough” 
moments in history is that they are consciously rooted in tradition. 
“Renaissance” is a special kind of purification, an attempt to reform the 
existing way of thinking, the way in which the world is understood. 
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Through concepts of the past, and return to forgotten values and, above 
all, to forgotten knowledge. Renaissance always views the contemporary 
world as barbaric and something as such to be rejected. Therefore, Ren­
aissance, as a return to what is “valuable” and “inspiring”, is seen all 
through history. Bernard of Chartres, evoked by me at the beginning of 
this paper, gave it the most thorough formulation. Paraphrasing his words, 
one may say that each epoch supports itself on the shoulders of giants, 
however not in every epoch is there awareness of this fact. Undoubtedly, 
however, the very change and movement of culture is in some was ef­
fected in reference to the past. The present is built with the conceptual 
tools bequeathed it from the past. Cultural development is, one might 
posit, in this sense teleological with each “cultural area” set on its own 
trajectory. Plessner, commenting on the “openness” of culture, has given, 
in my opinion, a certain expression of that very movement in structure. 
Plessner did away with traditional, metaphysical formulation of the con­
cept of human existence. At the same time, however, he wrote about man 
as a complex creature, functioning at all levels of the “order” referred to 
above. Man is conditioned by “his” past, and this conditioning leaves to 
hand the tools of this past. Therefore, one can say that in a change there is 
an element of constancy, which however does not eliminate or block any 
further development. In fact this is exactly the condition under which 
development comes about - in a dialectical relation with the past.
The “openness” revoked by Plessner does not signify vagueness or 
lack of identity. Man, as a biological being, is conditioned by this basic 
level of his existence. As a cultural being, he is, in tum, conditioned by 
interpersonal relationships and social structures. Plessner’s thought on the 
development of man in culture could be contrasted with the philosophy of 
Sartre, which posited the total freedom of human existence. That is, he as 
it were, teared man from Plessnerian structure. That is saying that man is 
freedom, Sartre most dramatically departs from the tradition that sought 
for the conditions of human existence beyond and of outside man himself. 
Man as freedom is a being that does not have anything to refer to, and the 
source of his every decision lies within himself. It is him who creates 
himself and grants himself a reason for being which he can only find in 
himself. Independence and freedom referred to by Sartre is probably the 
most distinctive and best example of twentieth-century thought that con­
strues man as “free” for determination of any kind.
Another example of this philosophy or paradigm, derived however 
from a different assumption, is Fukuyama’s “Last man”. Sartre points to 
a lack of essence that can determine human existence and understanding 
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of it. Existence precedes essence7 *, which for the French existentialist 
means that man must create himself according to his own “choice”. Fu­
kuyama, creating a more “futuristic” vision, i.e. heuristics in Hans Jonas’ 
sense of the word, describing the effects that radical interference with the 
human body can have on the human condition and on man’s way of 
thinking of himself. „As contemporary biology at last fills the notion of 
human nature with its empirical content, biotechnological revolution - 
warns Fukuyama - can take our nature away from us. Here man “has” 
“a cluster of’ factors which are basic to him. According to Plessner this 
nature is ratio and it its ratio which brings about cultural development. 
However, this development can paradoxically present a dangerous to us. 
Now, the threat perceived by Fukuyama does not concern existence as 
such, but the way of existence. The question posed by the American sci­
entist is a question concerning human consciousness: who we will be 
after having interferred with, so drastically, his condition. Shall the one 
created by biotechnology still be a human being? Fukuyama points to 
consciousness as the basic factor shaping man as man, that is as himself. 
And this factor, he never has not been fully examined and understood by 
biologists, philosophers or cognitivists. The second factor that shapes 
man and is decisive on his nature is the genotype.9 Consciousness, with 
all its complexity, together with the biology (which conditions) are in 
human evolution and construct the phenomenon, that is unity of man - 
a creature which is both rational and emotional. Man as a social being has 
a strongly developed sense of value as he acts in pursuit of the develop­
ment of his “personality”. For Fukuyama, the essence of human nature 
lies in its continuity, becoming oneself, acquiring the thing that has been 
named „dignity”. In his exposition, which warns about using technology 
recklessly, Fukuyama tries to demonstrate the importance and uniqueness 
of human nature. Biotechnology can cause the very basis for speaking of 
any dignity whatsoever to vanish, so that instead of man (with his bio­
logical and cultural conditionings, comforts and lacks) we shall be deal­
ing with another essence - with technology.
7 Comp. J.P. Sartre, Egzystencjalizm jest humanizmem [Existentialism is humanism], 
translated by Janusz Krajewski, Muza, Warszawa 1998, p. 46.
1 M. Fukuyama, Koniec człowieka [The End of Human], translated by Bartłomiej 
Pietrzyk, Znak, Kraków 2004, p. 27.
’ Ibidem, p. 226.
Fukuyama’s viewpoint shows that in the process of searching for the 
answer or answers to the question about human nature, in his evolution 
and diversity, a philosopher faces a new problem. Change is by its nature 
unpredictable necessitating a reformulation of the question. The defence 
of human dignity taken up by Fukuyama shows distinctly that in the 
modem world and into the future not only is his position no longer central 
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in the world, but it is becoming more and more vague and undefined. 
Fukuyama’s thinking leads to the emergence as a necessity of a new Re­
naissance. Moreover, with the development of the sciences, humanity as 
such is problematized. This brings us back to Scheier, who emphasised 
this. Scheier saw in philosophy the potential for an answer since it has, 
for him, the capability to examine man from many different angles, syn­
thesizing or generalizing results of examinations from these self-same 
detailed fields of science.10 The investigations of Gehlner and Plessner 
show in turn that, in the face of such a problematic examination of human 
nature, it is necessary to attempt to grasp man in his unity, consisting in 
and from the multifacetedness that are features of his psycho-physical 
nature.
10 Por. M. Scheier, Pisma z antropologii filozoficznej [fPritnings of Philosophical An­
thropology], translated by Stanisław Czernią & Adam Węgrzecki, PWN, Warszawa 1987, 
p. 152.
11 Comp. E. Lćvinas, Całość i nieskończoność. Eseje o zewnętrzności, translated by 
Małgorzata Kowalska, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1998, p. 128.
12 Comp. H. Plessner, op.ciL, p. 55
13 Ibidem, p. 61.
In the discussion of the role of the body and its influence on con­
sciousness and the impact of consciousness upon the body, which tran­
scended the Cartesian limitations and the implied problems, Plessner 
points to the role of the body, emphasising not only its biology or physi­
cality but also its symbolic content. Man, above all, is not his body, he is 
“within” the body and, moreover, outside the body (through the possibil­
ity of distancing himself from his corporeality, or treating it as a set of 
specific tools). For man, the body, therefore, performs manifold functions 
which in tum conditions in some way his consciousness. Above all, it is 
his upright position, resulting from evolutionary adaptation, which condi­
tions a specific kind of consciousness. Free hands, that is hands unen­
cumbered in locomotion become a useful tool, which, thereby, distances, 
as it were, one from one’s own body, breaking one’s self-identification 
with one’s corporeality. Face and eyes gain the ability to survey a wider 
perspective, thereby capturing spatial relationships more completely. Of 
such a “role” of the body, which traverses the functional, evolutionary 
and the symbolic, Lévinas treated the upright position as one that sym­
bolizes the “vertical” nature of human existence as, stretching between 
heaven and earth.11 The body is to be between the sensual and the spiri­
tual and the rational. However, Plessner avoids such lyricism, referring 
instead only to the body’s constitution as an element conditioning human 
development,12 shaping the specifics of human awareness. Still, the Ger­
man philosopher adds that “the perpendicular is always a distinguished 
direction.”13 Through grasping the specificity of the unity of body and 
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consciousness, Plessner points to the unique nature of being in the human 
world. Man’s attitude towards his own body is equivocal, as he identifies 
himself with it and, at the same time, treats it as an object. For Plessner 
man experiences the world “directly”. The eye and the hand “bring 
home” the object, delivering it as it were to themselves. This means there­
fore, something intermediates between man and the world. In this way 
man does not in fact experience the world in a direct way, since the very 
act of being in the world, of cognisance, is an “indirect directness”.4 
Indirect directness results from man’s specific access to the world, and it 
is perhaps his “verticality”, that is most definitive of it.
The upright position forces man to concentrate on his own body, in 
order to maintain balance on his too legs. Maintaining this immobile 
stance referred to by Plessner, is later compared to the activity of speech. 
Indeed, all such activities require concentration and a constant develop­
ment of competencies. This kind of development serves man’s intellec­
tual development. On the other hand, this concentration on the body 
brings an „emancipation”14 5 of consciousness from the body, which in turn 
positions him to master the same. In emancipation, man gains distance 
from himself, beginning to perceive his body as one amongst others, as an 
object among other objects. This latter perspective gives us identity and 
difference, and with it understanding. The most important issue in the 
“handling” of the problem of the body in Plessner’s philosophy is what he 
depicts as the mutual dependence of the body and mind. This means that 
man’s attitude towards the body is his attitude towards consciousness. 
Man, as an animal, is defined and created by the biological level, and 
therein is equipped with the capacity to transcend this level. This tran­
scendence is a distancing himself from biological determination.
14 Ibidem, p. 61.
15 Ibidem, p. 66.
“ Ibidem, p. 73.
The aforementioned human condition as open to the world is defined 
by and in the very “psycho-physical nature” of man. The openness about 
which Plessner writes is the result of distance, which is produced by the 
influence of the mixture or conjury of what is consciousness of the body. 
The indirect directness of man’s being within the world distinguishes him 
from other animals, dependent as they are on reality. Man is at distance to 
the world. Since man is able to distance himself, he is never at one with 
what surrounds him. This, as it were, alienation, means he, can unlike 
other species, transform his environment, independent as he is from it. 
“From a purely biological point of view”, Plessner argues, “man is no­
where at home.”16 He selects and creates for himself the space in which 
he exists. The distance man creates between himself and the world means 
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not only that his adaptation to the environment is highly flexible, but it 
also points to the fact that a man is never and can never be fully at home. 
The bipolarity of human nature (biological and cultural) means that man 
adapts along these two axis - the natural and artificial. “Distance” means 
that man can consider his own being from outside. Avoiding identifica­
tion with his own body, man treats it as something that is not a body; 
indeed as something that is not his. Therefore, distance is, above all, 
a “frame” used in order to grasp who one is and allows one to choose the 
most appropriate action. The contemporary human condition reflects 
the spirit of this changeability that is hidden in his primordial inability to 
adapt to reality. The distance that characterizes man’s attitude towards 
himself and the world allows him to change not only the environment, but 
also culture. This cultural transformation draws from the values, attitudes, 
rules and institution of other cultures. Culture and its institutions is char­
acterised by the same “openness” and “change” as operates at the level of 
the body, resulting as it does from the same source: distance. And, even 
though at first sight this distance can suggest man’s weakness (Herderian 
biological lack), the gap that is created therein allows for the emergence 
of what is the specifically human features of: language, tools, in short, his 
wonderful creativeness in adversity. Man lives in the world as a tempo­
rary tenant, creating various attitudes in order to fulfil various (material 
and spiritual) needs.
The unity of the biological and cultural expressed in the formulation 
“psycho-physical”, becomes most clear, or is enunciated most clearly in 
the theory of so-called memes. Plessner’s philosophy, (which depicts man 
as a body distanced from itself and towards its own environment, as 
a consciousness shaping the culture, developed on a biological founda­
tion), can be enriched by just this very theory of “memes”. Memes are 
replicators (autonomously replicating units) of culture, their operation and 
functioning is analogous to the operation of genes, with the difference 
that memes are replicators encoded in the human mind (they are the genes 
of consciousness). As a result of an exchange of memes, in “brains, new, 
persistent structures emerge, material carriers of cultural replicators”.17 
Human activity is, therefore, determined by intellectual structures build­
ing up in the brain and shaping human thinking and behaviour. These 
permanent structures - referred to, among others, by Dawkins, who first 
wrote about memes in “The Selfish Gene”18 - are the basic elements 
shaping culture. An important thing is that memes emerge in the brain 
17 M. Biedrzycki, Genetyka kultury [Genetics of Culture], Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 
1998, p. 9.
18 Por. R. Dowkins, Samolubny gen [The Selfish Gene], translated by M. Skoneczny, 
Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 1996, p. 262.
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and operate according to the principle of biological evolution and envi­
ronmental adaptation, and their carriers are neurons.19 Memes and genes 
are analogous in that they function in a similar way. The difference is that 
genes pertain to the body and memes to mind. „As genes group them­
selves into sets, constituting programmes for creating complex organs, so 
memes associate in order to create bigger cultural units: languages, tradi­
tions and customs, art styles, religious and political dogmas...”2
” Comp. M. Biedrzycki, op.cit., p. 71.
20 M. Biedrzycki, op.cit., p. 38.
211 omit the controversies around it on purpose, as 1 want only to highlight and to show 
the possibilities of such viewpoint.
I do not want to go further into the theory of memes21, to defend this 
viewpoint or to polemicise it. What is important in this theory for our 
purposes is the affirmation its gives of a mutual conditioning of these two 
levels of human existence. This theory, assuming a replication of culture, 
seeks to explain the persistence of certain patterns of behaviour in culture 
by which the people of today are conditioned. Their utility in culture is 
the utility of genes in biology: a mechanism of survival. We may call 
“life” that which unites or in which are united these two levels and corre­
sponding mechanisms. Moreover, memes as carriers of patterns of cul­
tural behaviour can explain why certain ways of behaviour or attitudes 
persist regardless of any changes or mutations in lifestyle. In culture, 
selections are made between a myriad of behavioural norms, judged 
against the extent to which they allow man to develop. In this process one 
memes may modify, another may disappeared while yet another may 
appear and takes its place. This is adaptation and selection.
In the philosophic tradition, one can enumerate different attitudes to­
wards tradition. From negation and rebellion, Nietzschean revaluation of 
all values, through pointing to the unity of the world’s processes, the 
attitude of melancholy, and to placing any and all positive values in the 
past. Processes that take place as interpreted according to culture and its 
role are connected with the very nature of this notion, which signifies 
change and includes the meanings of transformation and cultivation. 
Culture truly is cultivation of the mind, cultivating what is human. Cul­
ture is the process that man is subjected to and which creates man. As 
a process, it is also a reproduction or repeating of some useful strategies 
or types of behaviour and attitudes. It is not only the theory of memes that 
shows culture in such a light. Memes is but one of many ways of thinking 
that treat culture as a process of human development, and evolution. This 
kind of thinking appears in Durkheim’s sociology, Adorno’s philosophy 
and in Levi-Strauss’s anthropology. This latter one in particular, in „Sad­
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ness of the Tropics”, presented this cultural viewpoint in an interesting 
way.
Lévi-Strauss, through his metaphor of the “geological shaping” of 
cultural structure, shows not only its accumulating and interdependent 
layers. Above all, he manages to capture the evolutionary nature of hu­
man behaviour in the process of shaping its own world. Cultures, their 
patterns, that is codes of human behaviour: language, beliefs and myths, 
emerge like rocks, in elevation, reciprocal accumulation and translocation 
of one element to the place of another.22 This “shaping” process accounts 
for the creation of a cultural system that is, on one hand, coherent, but on 
the other hand contains certain covert elements, common structures, 
a cultural substrate which an investigator of culture can only near, like 
a geologist, the deeper layers hidden in actions, intentions and in human 
language or perceptions of the universe. A variety of models of culture, 
which we experience as participants, are aspects of hidden structures 
which are decisive in the shape and existence of that which is given to us 
this way. This way, structuralism allows the theorist to explain culture as 
a common ground for people from various groups and cultures. It also 
makes possible an explanation of the processuality and dynamism of 
these structures. Since, anyway, all of them are based on one foundation, 
of which we are not aware, in their transformations they express these 
unconscious structures or approximate us to them. Hence the process that 
culture is has such a dynamic nature while being open to the values con­
tained in tradition. Lévi-Strauss also demonstrates that change in and of 
culture are necessary and ubiquitous and that such changes can be both 
slow, and quick (despite the imagery employed of “evolutionary change” 
and “geological elevations”). Each newly growing form or cultural for­
mation has its roots in the previous ones. Even if the change is radical, 
it cannot be a departure from or denial of the old structural foundation; it 
always contains a cultural structure that is common to both of them. The 
perspective structuralism open up, then, allows us to see culture as a unity 
something that, or better, in which, the old and lost can be reconstructed 
and rebuilt.
22 Por. C. Lévi-Strauss, Smutek tropików [Tristes tropiques], translated by A. Steins­
berg, PIW, Warszawa 1960, p. 67 and next.
In this sense “renaissance” is integral to culture, since culture, as 
a matter of fact, is renaissance in its very nature. As the structure of the 
human world, through which man is created and in which he has the op­
portunity to exist and to “be himself’, culture assumes a reference to the 
past. Because culture preserves in itself what allows man to develop and 
in turn return to values and attitudes which, formerly abandoned, can 
suddenly become and be seen to be of use. The very meaning of the term 
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“culture” itself points to the dynamic nature of the process signified by it. 
Primarily, culture means cultivation, development or nursing of the mind, 
a transformation of man on many levels. Culture interpreted in this way 
is, thereby, a process of creation, a shaping: the personality of an indivi­
dual, the image of society, the forms of social existence and the relation­
ship between an individual and society. Culture also shapes society, cre­
ating its codes of behaviour, values, and objectives. Interestingly, Chris 
Jenks, describing such a understanding of culture, writes: „Culture as 
process assumes not only change, but also its objective, which is culture 
itself; it is here that hierarchic notions of a cultural person or enlightened 
individuals, or even an idea of higher culture, are bom.”23 This way, 
Jensk combines the process-like nature of cultural phenomena with their 
objective, which suggests that culture is a purposefill process, is a form­
ing of individuals, collectives in a certain direction or order. Culture as 
process includes movement, direction or possibility of self-development. 
Therefore, when some ideas or cultural attitudes pass away new ones 
come to be, or there is a return of tendencies to “reactivate” and recon­
struct ideas of the past. Hence, contemporary man, as much as the 12,h or 
the 15th Century man did, needs support generated by the past and also 
needs to persist with, and in, his attitudes on the basis of many kinds of 
evolving ethos and codes of behaviour.
23 Ch. Jenks, Kultura [Culture], translated by W.J. Burszta, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 1999, 
p. 15.
